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A person who gives poison may be recognized. He does 
not answer questions, or they are evasive answers; he speaks 
nonsense, rubs the great toe along the ground, and shivers; his 
face is discolored; he rubs the roots of the hair with his fi ngers; 
and he tries by every means to leave the house…
(Ayur-Veda, about 900 B.C.)
The above citation, borrowed from Trovillo (1939, p. 849), 
shows that people’s interest in detecting the deceptions of 
dangerous others is longstanding. Deception detection has also 
interested psychology and communication scholars, who have 
explored, among other topics, the liars’ behavior, the detectors’ 
strategies, and how to improve detection accuracy. In recent years, 
substantial advances have been made in the fi eld. The goal of the 
current article is to briefl y summarize some of these contributions, 
thus providing an updated (though necessarily incomplete because 
of space limitations) description of the state of the art in deception 
research. In the fi nal section, some avenues for future research are 
outlined. 
How people (try to) detect deception
Deception and behavior
Besides attesting to the longstanding nature of humans’ 
preoccupation with deceit, the Ayur-Veda citation above also shows 
that three millennia ago people already believed that behavioral 
cues reveal deception. This belief has persisted throughout history, 
not only among lay people worldwide (Global Deception Research 
Team, 2006) but also among scientists, who have spent several 
decades trying to identify valid behavioral cues to deception (see 
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Antecedentes: la detección de mentiras ha interesado a la humanidad a 
lo largo de la historia. También a los científi cos, quienes han explorado 
diferencias psicológicas y conductuales al mentir vs. decir la verdad, 
así como modos de aumentar la precisión de la detección. Método: 
recientemente se han hecho avances sustanciales en esta área. En el 
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de investigación de la detección de mentiras ha experimentado grandes 
desarrollos en tiempos recientes. A menudo (aunque no siempre) se ha 
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Algunas vías de indagación novedosas están empezando a explorar 
temas nuevos y, seguramente, darán lugar a futuros hallazgos nuevos e 
interesantes.
Palabras clave: engaño, detección de mentiras, entrevistas, CBCA, control 
de la realidad, polígrafo.
Psicothema 2017, Vol. 29, No. 2, 149-159
doi: 10.7334/psicothema2017.34
 
Received: January 25, 2017 • Accepted: March 3, 2017





brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Gestion del Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Salamanca
Jaume Masip
150
Ekman, 2009; Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 
1981). However, recent meta-analyses have indisputably revealed 
that people can hardly detect deception from the observation of 
behavior (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), that the connection between 
lying and nonverbal cues is weak, as well as under the infl uence 
of a host of moderator variables (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006, 2007), and that cue training to detect deception 
hardly improves accuracy (Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 
2016). 
In short, people are poor judges of veracity, and even though 
they strongly believe that behavioral cues reveal deception (and 
focus on such cues when trying to assess veracity; see Bond, 
Howard, Hutchison, & Masip, 2013; Hartwig & Bond, 2011), meta-
analytical evidence questions the utility of behavior as a source of 
deception markers. 
Judgmental biases and the adaptive lie detector theory
A well-established fi nding in deception research is that lay 
people display a truth bias—that is, they tend to believe others 
are telling the truth rather than lying (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999). This bias is reduced or even 
reversed among practitioners whose job involves judging someone 
else’s veracity, such as police offi cers (Masip, Alonso, Herrero, & 
Garrido, 2016; Meissner & Kassin, 2002).
The Adaptive Lie Detector Theory (ALIED; Street, 2015), 
which aims at explaining how people judge veracity, can help 
understand these divergent tendencies. Because behavioral 
deception cues are weak, the senders’ statements often contain 
little or no information indicative of veracity. According to ALIED, 
under those circumstances, people make an informed guess 
based on context-general information. The base rate of truthful 
or deceptive statements is a kind of context-general information. 
Most statements that lay people regularly encounter in their daily 
lives are truthful; therefore, when they are uncertain about the 
veracity of a specifi c statement they tend to make truth judgments. 
However, practitioners such as police offi cers encounter deceptive 
messages more often than lay people; therefore, they are less likely 
to assume truthfulness when they are uncertain. 
A major conceptual contribution of ALIED is that the common 
view that truth- and lie-biases are irrational tendencies that limit 
judgmental accuracy is replaced with the alternative notion that 
receivers with no access to specifi c diagnostic cues make the 
rational decision to focus on the general context to make the 
best possible guess. ALIED has been empirically supported 
in experimental research where cue diagnosticity has been 
manipulated. The fi ndings revealed that the less diagnostic the 
cues, the more the participants used context-general information 
(specifi cally, the base-rates of lying) to assess veracity (Street, 
Bischof, Vadillo, & Kingstone, 2016). 
Lie detection outside the laboratory
The above fi ndings about people’s poor lie-detection skills are 
mostly derived from laboratory experiments. In such experiments, 
observers are requested to make immediate judgments about 
the veracity of unacquainted senders’ statements on the basis 
of behavioral information alone (which, as explained above, is 
poorly diagnostic of veracity). All these three elements make the 
task extremely challenging. Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, 
and Ferrara (2002) asked participants (college students) to recall 
a lie they had detected in the past and to describe how they had 
detected it. They found that outside the laboratory lies are typically 
detected from contextual rather than behavioral information. 
Contextual information involves aspects such as physical evidence, 
third-party information, the liar’s confession, and inconsistencies 
with prior knowledge. Furthermore, Park et al. found that outside 
the laboratory lies are typically detected in familiar others and 
long after they have been told. It is therefore apparent that the low 
accuracy rates derived from laboratory experiments may not be 
generalized to real-life contexts. 
The superiority of contextual information compared to 
behavioral cues when it comes to judging veracity has also been 
demonstrated in experimental research. Both Blair, Levine, and 
Shaw (2010) and Bond et al. (2013) found in a series of experiments 
that observers reached higher accuracy rates when contextual 
information was available to them than when they had to base 
their veracity judgments on behavioral cues only. 
Park et al.’s (2002) fi nding that in real life lies are typically 
detected from contextual information was replicated by Masip and 
Herrero (2015) with both police offi cers and community members. 
They also found that the very same participants who reported 
having detected lies from contextual (rather than behavioral) 
information in the past listed a number of behavioral cues when 
asked to indicate “how lies can be detected”. This fi nding suggests 
that the allure of behavioral cues is strong when it comes to judging 
veracity. Indeed, Bond et al. (2013) demonstrated that people may 
forego perfectly diagnostic contextual information to base their 
judgments on poorly diagnostic behavioral cues.
We can therefore speculate that in real life people also focus on 
behavioral cues when they try to detect deception. However, this 
strategy is futile. In contrast, contextual information, either actively 
searched for by a persistent suspicious receiver or accidentally 
stumbled upon by a candid one, is indeed much more revealing. 
The so-called situational familiarity effect looks consistent with 
the notion that contextual information is a better indicator of truth 
or deception than behavioral cues. Indeed, the veracity judgments 
of receivers who are familiar with the situation are more accurate 
than those of receivers unfamiliar with the situation. Presumably, 
the former compare the sender’s statement with their situational 
knowledge to assess plausibility (Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, 
& Marksteiner, 2011). However, Reinhard, Scharmach, and Sporer 
(2012) found that perceived (not necessarily actual) familiarity is 
enough for the effect to occur. Therefore, the situational familiarity 
effect is caused, at least in part, by factors other than the validity 
of contextual cues.
Truth-default Theory
Recently, Levine (2014) proposed the Truth-default Theory 
(TDT). Rather than a unitary theory, TDT is a compilation of 
interrelated and logically coherent notions based on previous 
research. TDT provides a valuable framework to understand 
everyday life’s deception and its detection. TDT’s propositions, 
which are supported by empirical research (see Levine, 2014), 
are summarized in Table 1. Some of the notions expressed above 
(human’s poor accuracy in judging veracity, their truth bias, the 
increased diagnostic value of contextual information relative to 
behavioral cues…) are incorporated into TDT. Propositions 13 
and 14 are related to the contents in the next section. 
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How to detect deception
The evidence that behavioral cues to deception have little 
diagnostic value has led to a shift in deception research. Many 
researchers are no longer interested in chasing elusive deception 
cues spontaneously displayed by the liar—such cues are weak and 
volatile. Instead, researchers are interested in designing interview 
strategies oriented to produce behavioral differences between 
truth-tellers and liars. In recent years, a huge amount of work has 
been conducted towards this goal, mainly in the laboratories of 
Vrij (UK) and Granhag (Sweden). The focus of this research is 
applied, as its ultimate goal is to provide the law enforcement with 
lie detection tools to be used when questioning crime suspects 
(Vrij & Fisher, 2016; Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Granhag, & 
Porter, 2010). Within this new perspective, the lie detector is 
no longer conceptualized as an observer who attentively but 
passively scrutinizes the sender’s behavior, but as an interviewer 
who actively employs specifi c questioning approaches that can 
reveal deception. 
These interview approaches need to be based on psychological 
differences between truth tellers and liars. For instance, Granhag, 
Hartwig, Mac Giolla, and Clemens (2015) argue that guilty 
suspects (liars) are unwilling to provide information to the police 
because this may expose them. Therefore, they will use avoidance 
strategies such as being elusive about their whereabouts, providing 
only vague details, or giving details the police cannot verify. 
When faced with the evidence, liars will use the escape strategy 
of denying that evidence. Conversely, innocent suspects (truth 
tellers) are eager to provide information because they feel this 
can help establish their innocence. When faced with some form 
of incriminating evidence, truth tellers will generally be willing 
to admit it because they believe “the truth will shine through” and 
that if they committed no crime they cannot be convicted because 
people get what they deserve (see Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Masip 
& Herrero, 2013). 
Strategic Use of Evidence
These differences between truth tellers and liars can be 
exploited to detect deception. For example, when some kind of 
evidence is available interviewers can use the Strategic Use of 
Evidence (SUE) technique (e.g., Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). 
Interviewers using the SUE technique question the suspect about 
their whereabouts while withholding the available incriminating 
evidence until the end of the interview—i.e., during the interview, 
the suspect is unaware of the evidence against him or her. 
Guilty suspects are expected to carefully avoid mentioning any 
potentially incriminating information, which will elicit statement-
evidence inconsistencies. For instance, close-circuit-television 
footage shows the suspect was near the crime scene just before 
the crime occurred, but the suspect states s/he was somewhere 
else. Conversely, innocent suspects will feel that because they 
are innocent they have nothing to hide and nothing to fear, and 
will therefore be more honest and forthcoming. As a result, their 
statements will be more consistent with the evidence. A meta-
analysis showed that the difference between liars and truth tellers 
in terms of statement-evidence inconsistencies was substantially 
larger when the SUE technique was used than when the evidence 
was disclosed early in the interview (Hartwig et al., 2014).
Verifi ability approach
The guilty suspects’ tendency to withhold information is also 
exploited in the verifi ability approach (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2014a). Guilty suspects lying about their alibi, particularly if they 
are explicitly requested by the interviewer to be very detailed, 
may feel that if they provide little detail they may look deceptive. 
However, if they provide many details the police can check on 
these details and fi nd out that the alibi is false. Liars may resolve 
this dilemma by providing unverifi able details. Conversely, truth 
tellers will provide more verifi able details than liars. Verifi able 
details involve the description of activities performed with or in 
Table 1
Propositions of Levine’s (2014) Truth-default Theory
01. Most people tell the truth most of the time.
02. Most lies are told by a few prolifi c liars.
03. Most people believe what others say most of the time (truth bias).
04. This is adaptive (because most communications people encounter are honest) and enables effi cient communication. However, it makes people vulnerable to occasional deception.
05. Both truthful and deceptive messages are means to attain certain goals. Most people do not lie if their goals can be attained telling the truth.
06. When the truth is inconsistent with the sender’s goals, people may doubt veracity.
07. Other “triggers” raising suspicion are a lack of coherence (internal logical consistency) in message content, discrepancies between the message and the known reality, and third-party 
information revealing deception.
08. If these triggers are strong enough, the person will scrutinize the message to assess veracity.
09. The person may judge the message as deceptive on the basis of communication context and motive, sender demeanor, third-party information, and degree of coherence and correspondence.
10. Deception triggers may not occur at the time of the deception.
11. Because (except for a few transparent liars) the relationship between veracity and behavior is poor, deception is not accurately detected by passively observing the senders’ behavior at the 
time the lie is told. 
12. Instead, whenever deception is detected, this occurs later in time via the liar’s confession, external evidence, or correspondence.
13. Context-sensitive questioning of the sender can produce diagnostic information. The wrong questioning may hinder detection accuracy.
14. Deception detection expertise does not involve skill in passively detecting and interpreting behavior but in generating diagnostic information from senders.
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the presence of other people the police may question, or in an area 
where the suspect believes there are surveillance cameras. They 
also involve admitting having performed activities that are regularly 
electronically recorded (e.g., using the credit card). Research has 
supported the notion that liars provide fewer verifi able details than 
truth tellers (e.g., Nahari et al., 2014a). Interestingly, this approach 
is immune to countermeasures; even if liars are aware that they 
must provide verifi able details, only truth tellers are in a position 
to provide them. In fact, a study showed that instructing suspects 
to give verifi able details resulted in an increase of such details 
among truth tellers but not among liars (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 
2014b). Thus, the explicit request to include verifi able details in the 
account increases the difference (in terms of this kind of details) 
between liars and truth tellers, thus enhancing the differentiation 
power of this technique. 
Cognitive load approaches
Liars and truth tellers can also differ in terms of cognitive 
effort. Vrij et al. (2010) argued that creating a lie might require 
more cognitive effort than just describing an episodic memory. 
Therefore, during an interview, the liars’ cognitive load might 
be higher than the truth tellers’. If cognitive load is artifi cially 
increased further, this may result in liars showing visible signs 
of mental overload. Research has tested the impact of a number 
of cognitive-load-inducing strategies on both behavioral cues and 
detection accuracy. Such strategies involved asking interviewees 
to describe the events in the reverse (instead of chronological) 
order, conducting the interview in a foreign language, or asking 
interviewees to stare at the interviewer’s eyes or to perform a 
secondary task during the interview (for an overview, see Vrij, 
Fisher, & Blank, 2017). 
Two major reviews have been published recently on the 
effectiveness of such strategies, one focused on the cues elicited 
(Vrij, Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann, 2016) and the other one focused 
on detection accuracy (Vrij et al., 2017). In addition to explicit 
cognitive-load-inducing procedures, these reviews included two 
additional strategies: First, encouraging interviewees to say more. 
As argued above, liars will presumably be less willing than truth 
tellers to add details, and will have to invent such details, which 
is cognitively diffi cult. Second, asking unexpected questions. 
Liars prepare for the interview, but they can prepare the answers 
to only those questions they can anticipate. Inventing answers to 
unexpected questions is mentally taxing and may result in little 
detail, implausible information, and contradictions between the 
answers of different suspects interviewed separately (e.g., Vrij et 
al., 2016). 
The cue review revealed that the percentage of cognitive cues 
that discriminated in the predicted direction when using a cognitive 
lie-detection approach (65% of the cues examined) was larger than 
the percentage of all kinds of cues that discriminated in either 
direction when using a “standard” interviewing approach (30%). 
More specifi cally, the cognitive approach elicited signifi cantly 
more detail, plausibility and consistency cues than the “standard” 
approach (Vrij et al., 2016). 
The accuracy meta-analysis revealed that accuracy in 
distinguishing between truths and lies was higher when using a 
cognitive approach (71% accuracy) than when using a “standard” 
approach (56% accuracy), both when humans made the veracity 
judgments and when the number of objective cues (e.g., number 
of details) were entered as predictors in statistical analyses that 
classifi ed the statements as either truthful or deceptive (e.g., 
discriminant analyses). Interestingly, humans in these studies 
were not informed about the cues they had to use to make their 
judgments; had they been informed, accuracy would probably 
have been even higher. Each of the three strategies (i.e., using 
cognitive-load-inducing procedures, asking interviewees to say 
more, and asking unexpected questions) boosted accuracy (Vrij, 
Fisher et al., 2017).
A number of concerns have been raised concerning cognitive 
lie-detection approaches. First, there are many circumstances 
where lying is not cognitively more taxing than truth telling (e.g., 
Blandón-Gitlin, López, Masip, & Fenn, in press; Burgoon, 2015; 
Sporer, 2016). Second, strong cognitive-load-inducing techniques 
can elicit visible indicators of overload not only among liars but 
also among truth tellers. The so-called TRI-Con (Time Restricted 
Integrity-Confi rmation) interview addresses this issue. When 
using TRI-Con, interviewers prompt interviewees about the 
general topic of the forthcoming questions. However, the specifi c 
questions are not revealed until the time they are asked. Such 
prompts activate truthful memories in working memory, which 
facilitates truthful responding but makes it cognitively harder to 
deceive, as liars must inhibit the activated memory and replace 
it with a fabrication (Walczyk et al., 2012). Third, the limits of 
cognitive lie-detection approaches need to be explored. For 
example, these approaches may not work to detect lies about 
intentions (Fenn, McGuire, Langben, & Blandón-Gitlin, 2015) 
or with stigmatized groups of people (Fenn, Blandón-Gitlin, 
Pezdek, & Yoo, 2016). Finally, the theoretical background of 
these approaches is generally weak; models specifying the 
specifi c cognitive mechanisms and processes involved in lying, 
which would allow for more precise and nuanced predictions, are 
needed (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, & Yoo, 2014; Blandón-
Gitlin et al., in press; for one such model, see Walczyk, Harris, 
Duck, & Mulay, 2014).
Systematic verbal lie detection approaches
Although behavioral cues are generally poor indicators 
of deception, meta-analyses show that verbal cues are more 
diagnostic than nonverbal cues (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hauch et al., 
2016). Some systematic approaches have been developed to assess 
credibility from the verbal content of extended free-narrative 
statements, such as the reality monitoring (RM) approach (Sporer, 
2004), and Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & 
Köhnken, 1989). Both are based on the notion that the verbal 
descriptions of self-experienced events differ from those of 
imagined or invented events. 
Reality Monitoring (RM)
According to the RM approach, relative to imagined or 
invented memories, actual autobiographical memories (and their 
verbal descriptions) contain more contextual (time, space…), 
sensory, and semantic information, as well as fewer references to 
cognitive processes at the time of encoding. Reviews show that 
accuracy rates in separating truths (i.e., descriptions of memories 
of self-experienced events) from lies (inventions) with the RM 
verbal criteria are typically within the 60%-to-70% range (Masip, 
Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2008). 
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Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA)
CBCA emerged in forensic settings in Germany to separate 
between true and false allegations of child sexual abuse 
(Undeutsch, 1989). It contains 19 credibility criteria (Table 2; see, 
e.g., Raskin & Esplin, 1991; Steller & Köhnken, 1989, for criteria 
descriptions). CBCA experts assume that the more the criteria the 
child’s statement contains (or the stronger the criteria), the more 
likely it describes a self-experienced event (see Volbert & Steller, 
2014, for underlying theoretical premises). However, the absence 
of criteria should not be interpreted as indicative of deception 
(e.g., Raskin & Esplin, 1991).
CBCA is to be used within a more general assessment procedure, 
called Statement Validity Assessment (SVA), which systematically 
considers a number of alternative reasons for the child’s allegation. 
SVA contains a semi-structured interview protocol to collect the 
child’s account, considers the potential infl uence of a number of 
variables (cognitive or language limitations, suggestibility, etc.) on 
statement quality, and considers other sorts of information besides 
statement quality to make the credibility judgment (e.g., Raskin & 
Esplin, 1991). Several countries admit SVA/CBCA assessments in 
court in child sexual abuse cases. 
Although CBCA was developed to assess the credibility of 
alleged child victims’ statements of sexual abuse, research has 
explored its usefulness to differentiate between truthful and 
deceptive statements of adults in addition to children, witnesses 
and suspects in addition to victims, and events other than sexual 
abuse (see Table 5 in Hauch, Sporer, Masip, & Blandón-Gitlin, in 
press, for the characteristics of CBCA studies). 
CBCA is a clinical assessment procedure rather than a 
standardized psychometric test. However, its reliability and 
validity are important if it is to be used in forensic practice (Hauch 
et al., in press). A meta-analysis on the inter-rater reliability 
of CBCA revealed that most criteria have suffi cient to good 
reliability (although whether reliability is high enough for CBCA/
SVA evidence to be admitted in court is open to discussion). 
However, as shown in Table 2, whereas reliability was consistently 
high for those criteria with straightforward defi nitions, it was 
poor for criteria with less clear defi nitions (e.g., Criteria 2 and 9). 
The latter criteria should be used with great caution. Proportion 
Table 2
Inter-rater reliability and validity of CBCA criteria according to recent meta-analyses
CBCA Criterion
Inter-rater Reliability (Hauch et al., in press)
















01. Logical structure .69 .79 .38 .18 .77 0.47 0.48
02. Unstructured production .46 .70 .32 .55 .40 0.40 0.53
03. Quantity of details .73 .70 .50 .75 .40 0.77 0.55
Specifi c Contents
04. Contextual embedding .71 .68 .43 .49 .67 0.69 0.19
05. Descriptions of interactions .65 .77 .41 .53 .62 0.44 0.27
06. Reproduction of conversation .86 .77 .61 .68 .73 0.53 0.34
07. Unexpected complications .64 .79 .39 .45 .67 0.29 0.25
Peculiarities of Contents
08. Unusual details .62 .73 .52 .67 .49 0.27 0.31
09. Superfl uous details .52 .71 .48 .46 .52 0.42 0.14
10. Accurately reported details misunderstood .81 .93 .47 .67 .91 0.31 0.22
11. Related external associations .67 .83 .27 .55 .59 0.28 0.26
12. Accounts of subjective mental state .79 .73 .58 .62 .61 0.46 0.18
13. Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state .76 .81 .55 .58 .64 0.18 0.09
Motivation-Related Contents
14. Spontaneous corrections .60 .71 .47 .59 .50 0.20 0.16
15. Admitting lack of memory .78 .70 .50 .60 .53 0.15 0.25
16. Raising doubts about one’s own testimony .73 .90 .32 .48 .91 0.19 0.20
17. Self-deprecation .79 .86 .61 .79 .81 0.16 0.04
18. Pardoning the perpetrator .72 .80 .56 .46 .85 0.23 -0.02
Offense-Specifi c Elements
19.Details characteristic of the offense .71 .75 .23 --d .73 1.25 0.28
Average .70 -- .45 .55 .62 0.40 0.25
Total CBCA score .90 .76 .65 --d .51 0.78 0.55
a Weighted analyses; b Without ≥.999 values; c Unweighted analyses; d Values not reported because the number of comparisons was too small
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agreement showed the highest reliability values because, unlike 
other reliability coeffi cients, it does not correct for chance 
agreement. Base rates (i.e., the relative presence of each criterion 
in statements) infl uenced criterion reliability (see Hauch et al.’s 
in-press report for detail). 
All meta-analytical estimates were very heterogeneous. 
Moderator analyses for Pearson’s r revealed that reliability was 
higher in fi eld studies and quasi-experiments than in laboratory 
settings. Note, however, that in all kinds of studies in this meta-
analysis raters had been carefully trained (background literature 
reading, lectures, examples, practice with discussion and feedback, 
sometimes homework…) for many hours (for half the studies 
reporting training duration, the training lasted more than 8.75 
hs; average training duration was 23 hs, SD = 40). Conversely, 
in non-research fi eld settings raters can differ greatly in terms of 
training. This suggests the current estimates represent the upper 
reliability limits that can be achieved (Hauch et al., in press). The 
same considerations can be made concerning validity. 
Hauch et al. (in press) suggest that CBCA experts testifying 
in court should include reliability estimates in their reports. 
Also, if several blind experts code different sections of the case 
statements, interrater reliability for a single case can be calculated 
and reported in court by the expert called to testify (Hauch et al., 
in press). 
Concerning the CBCA validity, two meta-analyses have 
been published recently on the topic, one focused on children’s 
reports (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015), and one on adults’ reports 
(Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilariño, 2016). All criteria signifi cantly 
differentiated between truthful and deceptive statements of 
children, though (a) most effect sizes were small according to 
Cohen’s (1988) guidelines (Table 2), and (b) for twelve criteria, 
effect sizes were not generalizable because of low inter-rater 
reliability (see the original report for effect sizes corrected for 
criterion unreliability and the associated credibility intervals). 
Similarly, all CBCA criteria but self-deprecation and pardoning 
the perpetrator signifi cantly differentiated between truthful and 
deceptive accounts of adult participants; however, except for the 
general characteristics criteria set, effect sizes were small (Table 
2). For adults, effect sizes were not generalizable (see original 
report). 
The effect size for the total CBCA score was larger for children’s 
accounts than it was for adults’ accounts. Further, among children, 
it was substantially larger for fi eld (d = 2.40) than for experimental 
studies (d = 0.50). However, as argued by Hauch et al. (in press), 
sum scores are problematic because (a) they make sense only if the 
different criteria measure a unidimensional construct, (b) validity 
differs across criteria, and (c) under certain circumstances, some 
CBCA criteria should weight more strongly than others. 
Amado et al. (2016) also found that the average effect size 
across criteria (for adult participants) was larger in fi eld studies 
(d = 0.34), particularly if they focused on sexual abuse or intimate 
partner violence (d = 0.67), than in experiments (d = 0.25). 
Surprisingly, the average effect size was larger for witnessed than 
for self-experienced events. 
Overall, the general-characteristics criteria set appears to be 
the most valid, and the motivational set the least valid. Criteria 4 
and 19 seem to discriminate very well with children, but not with 
adults. In general terms, CBCA as a whole seems to work better 
with children than with adults. It should be stressed, however, that 
CBCA must be used within the SVA framework, and that intensive 
training in clinical psychology and psychological assessment is 
essential to properly understand and to be able to use CBCA and 
SVA (see Hauch et al., in press). 
RM and CBCA
Oberlander et al. (2016) meta-analyzed the validity of both RM 
and CBCA. Rather than looking at individual criteria, they focused 
on the fi nal credibility judgments made on the basis of either sum 
scores, statistical decisions, or the rater’s personal decision. The 
overall effect size was g = 1.03, which is large and was signifi cant. 
Assuming equal sensitivity and specifi city, it would result in 70% 
of truths and 70 % of lies correctly detected (Oberlander et al., 
2016). RM showed higher validity (g = 1.26) than CBCA (g = 
0.97), but the difference was not signifi cant. The full set of CBCA 
criteria permitted better discrimination than incomplete sets. 
Effect sizes did not differ across fi eld and laboratory studies or for 
self-experienced vs. observed events; these null effects are at odds 
with Amado et al.’s (2015, 2016) fi ndings for CBCA. 
Psychophysiological detection of deception
Attempts were also made from ancient times to detect deception 
from the suspect’s physiological reactions. The Ayur-Veda citation 
above refers to shivering and pallor, and Trovillo (1939) explains 
how the Greek physician Erasistratus (300-250 B.C.) was able to 
fi nd out that Prince Antiochus of Syria was secretly in love with 
his young stepmother Stratonice by feeling his pulse. Some old 
lie-detection methods were based on the assumption that lying 
elicits fear, and refl ect some understanding of physiology. For 
instance, in ancient China and India, crime suspects were given 
rice to chew; if they could not spit it out they were considered 
guilty. This ordeal refl ects the observation that high stress reduces 
salivation (Kleinmuntz & Szucko, 1984). 
Psychophysiological lie detection received a push in the 
1920s. There was at the time a climate of reform towards police 
professionalization in the US that involved the adoption of 
scientifi c methods and procedures by the law enforcement (see 
Leo, 2009). In this context, Marston, Larson, and Keeler made 
innovations to record the suspect’s heart rate, blood pressure, 
respiration, and skin conductance during questioning to assess 
the suspect’s truthfulness (Alder, 2007; Bunn, 2012; Lykken, 
1998). This was the beginning of polygraphic lie detection. 
More recently, electroencephalography and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) have also been tested as lie-detection 
procedures (e.g., Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011).
Lie detection tests
The two lie detection tests that have received most attention 
are the Comparison Question Test (CQT) and the Concealed 
Information Test (CIT). The CQT is used by the law enforcement 
in several countries around the world. Conversely, the CIT 
is rarely used in applied settings except in Japan, where it is 
ordinarily employed by the police (Ogawa, Matsuda, Tsuneoka, 
& Verschuere, 2015).
During a CQT the examinee is asked a series of irrelevant 
(e.g., “Is today Tuesday?”), relevant (e.g., “Did you murder Miss 
Smith?”) and comparison questions (e.g., “During the fi rst 20 
years of your life, did you ever hurt anyone?”). The examinee 
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is instructed to respond “no” to comparison questions, but 
because they are deliberately vague and remote, the examinee is 
uncertain about the truthfulness of that response. The examinee 
is told that evidence of deception when responding to comparison 
questions would suggest s/he is the kind of person who could have 
committed the crime under investigation (e.g., Vrij, 2008). Guilty 
examinees are assumed to be more concerned by relevant than 
by comparison questions; therefore, they are expected to display 
the strongest physiological responding just after the relevant 
questions. Conversely, innocent examinees are expected to be more 
concerned by—and, hence, to react more strongly to—comparison 
than to relevant questions (e.g., Raskin, 1989). Iacono and Lykken 
(1997) conducted mail surveys on (a) members of the Society for 
Psychophysiological Research (SPR), and (b) fellows of Division 1 
(General Psychology) of the American Psychological Association 
(APA). Most respondents believed the CQT is not based on any 
scientifi cally sound psychological principle or theory.  
The CIT differs in many respects from the CQT. During a 
CIT, the examinee is asked a series of multiple-choice questions 
(e.g., “Which was the weapon used to murder Miss Smith? Was 
it …a knife? …a gun? …a sword? …a baseball bat? ...an axe? …
an arrow?”). For each question, only one of the response options 
(which can be presented either verbally or in pictorial form) is 
correct. Only those examinees who have knowledge about the 
crime details will consistently show stronger physiological 
reactions to correct than to incorrect alternatives through (most 
of) the test. Of note, the CIT does not attempt to detect deception, 
but concealed knowledge. In fact, the CIT can be used by the 
police to uncover new information (Ogawa et al., 2015). Imagine 
a person is missing and the police believes she was murdered by 
her partner. The police could run a CQT asking the suspect about 
the location of the body. The response alternatives would all be 
plausible locations. After the test, the police could check whether 
the body is indeed at the location suggested by the test results. 
Unlike the CQT, which is used only with peripheral measures, 
the CIT is also used with central or “brain” measures such as 
fMRI and event-related potentials (ERPs). The most studied 
ERP in deception research is called P300, and is a positive 
electroencephalographic wave that starts at about 300 ms after 
the onset of the stimulus eliciting it. P300 has been found to 
accompany the recognition of meaningful information (e.g., 
Iacono, 2015; Rosenfeld, 2011). The CIT is also used with so-
called behavioral measures—that is, reaction time and errors is 
replying “yes” or “no”, typically by pressing a specifi c key, after 
stimulus presentation. The CIT variant normally used with central 
and behavioral measures contains target, probe and irrelevant 
stimuli. Target and probe stimuli are presented only rarely (about 
15% of the time each), whereas irrelevant stimuli are presented 
quite often (about 70% of the time). Targets (e.g., a facial picture of 
Miss Smith that was shown in the TV news the day after she was 
found dead) are known by both guilty and innocent examinees. 
During the test, all examinees admit they know targets by pressing 
the “yes” button. Because targets are known to all respondents, 
they will elicit physiological responding regardless of guilt. 
Probes (e.g., a picture of the weapon used to kill Miss Smith) are 
known by guilty but not by innocent examinees. All examinees 
press the “no” button when a probe is presented. However, because 
probes are meaningful for guilty (but not for innocent) suspects, 
guilty suspects will show physiological reactions when probes are 
presented. Finally, the frequent irrelevant stimuli are meaningless 
for all examinees regardless of guilt and will thus elicit no 
physiological responding. Note that for innocent examinees probes 
are the same as irrelevant as irrelevant stimuli, whereas for guilty 
examinees probes are the same as meaningful as target stimuli. 
The pattern of physiological responding during a CIT can be 
caused by the orienting response (OR), which occurs when an 
organism encounters a novel and/or signifi cant stimulus (MacKay-
Brandt, 2011). The OR allows the organism to determine how 
to react. It increases skin conductance, decreases heart rate, 
interrupts respiration, and is thought to produce a P300 wave. 
Response inhibition (i.e., the suppression of the dominant truthful 
response) can also play a role during a CIT, as it is associated with 
a decrease in heart rate and respiration, an increase of the P300 
amplitude, and the activation of certain brain areas recorded with 
fMRI (see reviews by Meijer, Verschuere, Gamer, Merckelbach, & 
Ben-Shakhar, 2016; Verschuere & Meijer, 2014). Most respondents 
of Iacono and Lykken’s (1997) survey believed the CIT is based on 
scientifi cally sound psychological principles or theories. 
Accuracy
Meijer and Verschuere (2015) presented an overview of 
available reviews examining the accuracy of the polygraph with 
both the CQT and the CIT. The top half of Table 3 displays the 
range of average sensitivity (accuracy in detecting lies or concealed 
information) and specifi city (accuracy in detecting truths) reported 
in the reviews considered by Meijer and Verschuere. Note that 
because of the way fi eld studies are conducted, accuracy rates 
for CQT fi eld studies might be infl ated (see Bull et al., 2004; 
Iacono, 1995). Also, only two individual CIT fi eld studies were 
available for inclusion in Meijer and Verschuere’s (2015) overview. 
Notwithstanding these issues, it is apparent from Table 3 that 
the CQT does a better job in detecting liars than truth tellers. 
Table 3
Sensitivity and specifi city of the polygraph, fMRI, and ERPs expressed as 
percentages 
Study type and measure Sensitivity Specifi city
CQT - Polygrapha,b
Laboratory studies 74%-82% 60%-83%
Field studies 84%-89% 59%-75%
CIT - Polygrapha 
Laboratory studies 76%-88% 83%-97%













a Data from Meijer and Verschuere (2015). b Because the GQT (unlike the CIT) allows for 
inconclusive test results, a 74% sensitivity rate for the CQT does not mean that 26% of liars 
were misclassifi ed as truth tellers; specifi cally, the percentage of liars misclassifi ed as truth 
tellers ranged between 7% and 8% (depending on the review) in laboratory studies, and 
between 1% and 13% in fi eld studies, whereas, the percentage of truth tellers misclassifi ed 
as liars ranged between 10% and 16% in laboratory studies, and between 12% and 19% in 
fi eld studies (Meijer & Verschuere, 2015). cOnly two individual studies.  d Data from Terol 
et al. (2014). eData from  Ganis (2015)
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Apparently, relevant questions are perceived as more threatening 
not only by guilty examinees but also by some innocent ones. 
Conversely, the CIT performs better with innocent than with 
guilty examinees. Apparently, some guilty individuals do not 
encode—or have forgotten at the time of the test—certain details 
about the event that are later probed during the test. 
In a review of 16 CIT studies measuring ERPs, Terol, Álvarez, 
Melgar, and Manzanero (2014) found the average accuracy rates 
displayed in the corresponding rows in Table 3. Before concluding 
that sensitivity is comparatively small, it is important to keep in 
mind that the authors included in their review several studies where 
guilty participants successfully tried to beat the test. It appears 
from these fi gures that ERPs, which are central measures, yield 
classifi cation rates very similar to those obtained with a polygraph 
(but see a recent experiment conducted by Langleben et al., 2016, 
that challenges this conclusion).
Ganis (2015) reviewed ten fMRI studies in which the brain areas 
activated during deception were mapped and then an attempt was 
made to identify individual liars and truth tellers on the basis of 
their activation in these areas. Again, as shown in the bottom rows 
in Table 3, classifi cation rates obtained with this sophisticated, 
cutting-edge brain imaging technology do not seem superior to 
those obtained with the old-fashioned polygraph. 
Finally, in a recent meta-analysis Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van 
Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, and Crombez (2017) found an effect 
size d = 1.297 for the reaction time (RT) difference between truths 
and lies using the CIT. After calculating Rosenthal and Rubin’s 
(1982; see also Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012) binomial effect 
size display (which assumes equal sensitivity and specifi city) it 
becomes apparent that RT measures would result in 77% of truths 
and lies correctly identifi ed.
Differential activation is a continuum, and examiners use 
somewhat arbitrary cutoff points on that continuum to categorize 
examinees as a truth tellers or liars. The percentage of liars (or 
truth tellers) correctly identifi ed depends on the specifi c location 
of the cutoff point on the continuum. To calculate accuracy 
independently of specifi c cutoff points, some researchers turned 
to Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. A ROC 
curve graphically displays all possible combinations of true 
positives (sensitivity), true negatives (specifi city), false positives 
(truth tellers misclassifi ed as liars), and false negatives (liars 
misclassifi ed as truth tellers). Accuracy can be represented as a 
single value, namely the area under the ROC curve (AUC). An 
AUC = .50 represents chance accuracy, whereas an AUC = 1.00 
denotes perfect accuracy (see Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000, 
for detailed and clear information about ROC curves). Table 4 
displays average and median AUC values for different measures 
reported in several meta-analyses (see Meijer et al., 2016). It is 
clear that, as stressed by Meijer et al. (2016), fi gures are very 
similar for peripheral, central, and behavioral measures. The AUC 
for fMRI appears to be higher, but Meijer et al. noted that this 
value is estimated from only four studies with few participants, 
and that because none of the studies used cross validation this 
fi gure might be an overestimation. 
Countermeasures
Properly trained examinees can beat the polygraph test by using 
either physical (e.g., pressing one’s toes to the fl oor) or mental (e.g., 
performing mental calculations) countermeasures (see Honts, 2014, 
for a recent review). Test sensitivity will decrease if examinees 
successfully increase their physiological responding to comparison 
questions (CQT) or irrelevant response alternatives (CIT), and/or 
if they successfully decrease their responding to relevant questions 
(CQT) or response alternatives (CIT). Countermeasure-detection 
techniques, such as movement sensors to be placed in the chair, 
have been developed by the polygraph industry, but research is 
lacking examining their effectiveness (Honts, 2014). 
An argument for the replacement of the traditional polygraph 
(which measures peripheral responses) with ERPs or fMRI 
(which measure central nervous system activity) is that the 
latter measures are not amenable to conscious manipulation by 
the examinees (e.g., Iacono, 2015). This argument is fallacious. 
ERP studies have shown that examinees can learn to use specifi c 
strategies that decrease the test sensibility substantially (e.g., 
Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004). Rosenfeld’s research 
group designed a new ERP-based lie-detection test to overcome 
this problem (Rosenfeld, Hu, Labkovsky, Meixner, & Winograd, 
2013). Regarding fMRI, in a study conducted by Ganis, Rosenfeld, 
Meixner, Kievit, and Schendan (2011) sensitivity decreased from 
100% to only 33% after the participants used a very simple 
physical countermeasure—although its use could be detected in 
the fMRI images. 
Summary
The relative sensitivity and specifi city of the polygraph depends 
on whether the examiner uses the CQT or the CIT. Central 
measures (which are normally employed with the CIT) do not 
permit better discrimination than either peripheral or behavioral 
measures, and are vulnerable to countermeasures.
Future prospects
Deception detection seems to be as much of a timely topic for 
the near future as it was back in the remote Ayur-Veda times. Space 
limitations made it impossible to discuss some emerging research 
topics that will presumably gain momentum in the near future. 
Table 4
Accuracy using different tests and measures expressed as the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC)
Study type and measure AUC
CQT – Laboratory Studies
Polygraph (peripheral measures)a Mdn = .85
CQT – Field Studies
Polygraph (peripheral measures)a Mdn = .89
CIT – Laboratory Studies
Polygraph (peripheral measures)a Mdn = .88
Skin conductance respondingb M = .85
Respirationb M = .77
Heart rateb M = .74
P300 (ERP)b M = .88
Reaction timeb M = .82
fMRIb M = .94
Note: Mdn = median; M = weigthed mean
a Data from the National Research Council (2003). b Data from Meijer et al. (2014, 2016)
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Specifi cally, current concerns about international terrorism and 
airport security have led researchers to investigate how to detect 
lies about future intentions (Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). The 
contemporary widespread use of communication technologies has 
led to the recent study of the infl uence of communication medium 
(face-to-face, phone, email, instant messaging…) on how much, 
how, to whom, and about what people lie, as well as on deception 
cues and lie detection (e.g., Smith, Hancock, Reynolds, & 
Birnholtz, 2014). Technological developments also led researchers 
to examine whether linguistic deception cues can be identifi ed 
with computers, but success has been limited (Hauch, Blandón-
Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2015). Computers can also integrate 
large amounts of information (e.g., scores on a number of verbal 
content criteria) to help humans judge credibility. For example, a 
procedure based on High Dimensional Visualization combining 
multidimensional scaling and virtual reality modelling has been 
quite successful in separating truthful from deceptive statements 
(e.g., Manzanero, Alemany, Recio, Vallet, & Aróztegui, 2015). 
Recent theories such as ALIED and TDT make testable 
predictions and will surely spur research. TDT has empirical 
support but some of its propositions would benefi t from replication, 
and new propositions can be added (Masip & Herrero, 2015; Van 
Swol, 2014). Little is known about how people (try to) detect lies 
outside laboratory settings; inspired by TDT and the evidence 
reviewed in the relevant section above, we recently started an 
ambitious research program along this line. 
Research on cognitive approaches to detect deception would 
benefi t from stronger theoretical bases. A promising theory 
is Walczyk et al.’s (2014) Activation-Decision-Construction-
Action Theory, which also makes many testable predictions 
that will stimulate research (e.g., Masip, Blandón-Gitlin, de 
la Riva, & Herrero, 2016). Sporer (2016) also made valuable 
theoretical contributions. The boundary conditions within which 
novel interview approaches to detect deception work need to be 
explored (Fenn et al., 2015), including the liars’ countermeasures 
(Luke, Hartwig, Shamash, & Granhag, 2016). Research has 
only started to examine how well practitioners can learn to use 
these new techniques (Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 
2015). Also, the application of such approaches to settings 
other than investigative interviewing needs to be explored (see 
Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Lafferty, & Nahari, 2017; Ormerod & Dando, 
2014, for applications to insurance claims and airport contexts, 
respectively). 
Systematic verbal credibility assessment approaches may 
benefi t from testing new criteria and from high-quality fi eld studies 
(which are rare) focusing on the kinds of cases forensic experts are 
called to testify about. Similarly, there are almost no fi eld studies 
on the CIT. However, uncertainty concerning ground truth in real 
cases has always hampered fi eld studies on deception detection, 
and will presumably continue to do so. The Japanese fi eld use of 
the Searching-CIT (that allows for material corroboration of the 
test results) might allow researchers to conduct sound CIT studies 
in fi eld settings. On the other hand, there are a number of aspects 
in the Japanese use of the CIT that differ from laboratory research 
(see Ogawa et al., 2015). The use of the polygraph in real criminal 
cases can have serious consequences for suspects; therefore, there 
is urgent need to examine under controlled laboratory conditions 
the impact of these peculiar practices on the test results.
ERP and fMRI are relatively new approaches. Many issues 
remain unexplored, in particular concerning fMRI. Indeed, 
more countermeasure research is needed. Other brain-imaging 
technologies that might conceivably develop in the future will 
surely stimulate lie-detection research.
Finally, the cognitive and reasoning functioning of both 
people with mental health challenges and people with intellectual 
disability differs from that of other individuals. Surprisingly, little 
research has been conducted on the production and detection of 
their lies (see, e.g., Manzanero et al., 2015, for an exception).
To conclude, these are exciting times for deception researchers. 
Many potential new avenues of inquiry lie before us. Only time 
will tell where this applied area of scientifi c research will lead us 
in the future.
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